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`SLAVERY' AND THE JENA 6: 
A TRAGEDY IN THREE ACTS 
ANTHONY V. BAKER* 
"WA remain imprisoned by the past as long as we 
deny its influence in the present."1  
I. PROLOGUE: ART . . . AND CRAFT 
Law changes things. A world of received and perceived 
meaning lies within this three-word mantra—the mantra of the 
post-Hurstian2 legal historian. For the law-in-history legal 
* Visiting Professor, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School; Professor of 
Law, the Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University; LL.M, 
University of Wisconsin Law School (1998); J.D., University of North 
Carolina—Chapel Hill (1981); A.B., Duke University (1977). A draft of this 
paper was presented at the Southeast/Southwest People of Color Legal 
Scholarship Conference 2008, at North Carolina Central University School of 
Law in Durham, North Carolina. Thanks to conference participants for the 
helpful responses to the presented draft. Special thanks are due to Professor 
Donald Tibbs of Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law, who both 
suggested and developed the concept of an intellectual consideration of 'Jena 6' 
in the broader African-American experience, of which this paper is a part. Many 
thanks are due to my son Andrew, who particularly supported and encouraged 
me in this project, and, as always, to my wife, for everything. 
' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Given the relevance of his words to the topic at hand, the full drift of Justice 
Brennan's comment should be recovered here: 
In more recent times, we have sought to free ourselves 
from the burden of this history. Yet it has been scarcely a 
generation since this Court's first decision striking down racial 
segregation, and barely two decades since the legislative 
prohibition of racial discrimination in major domains of 
national life. These have been honorable steps, but we cannot 
pretend that in three decades we have completely escaped the 
grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries. Warren 
McCleskey's evidence confronts us with the subtle and 
persistent influence of the past. His message is a disturbing 
one to a society that has formally repudiated racism, and a 
frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to regarding its destiny 
as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at 
our peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we 
deny its influence in the present. 
Id. His words are as insightful and true today as they were the day he first wrote 
them, twenty years ago. This paper is one more illustration of this poor 'truth.' 
2 Here, of course, I mean to doff my intellectual cap to and give due 
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historian,3 the simple fact that conflicting parties turn to law for the 
resolution of real differences is a truth of the very first order.4 Of 
equal primacy is the companion truth that, as law completes its 
received task of preferring one pleading party while concomitantly 
deferring the other, inevitably and inexorably, things change. The 
self-conscious appeals to law for these tasks, the preferences and 
deferments, and the inevitable personal, social, communal and 
even spiritual changes that follow,5 form the grist of the work of 
the law-in-society oriented legal historian. 
deference to the erstwhile paterfamilias of the `law in action' legal history 
school, Professor J. Willard Hurst. Through the breadth of my own work, my 
intellectual and spiritual debt to him and his remains plain. 
3 
 By use of the term `law-in-history' here, I am highlighting the two major 
schools of legal historical scholarship broadly at play in the American legal 
academy at present, and I am choosing between them. The classically trained 
and focused legal historian is a 'history-of-law' type, applying the academic 
tools of the historian to the subject of her study—law—to trace out its 
incremental development over time. Thus, the subject of study is `law' and tools 
of the historian outline the `story' over time with regard to that subject. A good 
example here would be the English common law doctrine of felony murder. The 
`history-of-law' type would begin with the law, here `felony murder,' and trace 
the inevitable, incremental limits of the doctrine over time, to its final abolition 
in 1957. The second of these academic schools is short-formed `law-in-history' 
and the dynamic is something quite opposite of that of the first school. The 
subject at issue here is society and the means by which the story of its change 
and development is discerned. The lens through which observations are made 
and `meta-data' is developed, if you will, is law. For example, the picture of 
America's phenomenal release of entrepreneurial energy through the mid-
nineteenth century becomes sharpest and clearest when the lens of law is added. 
See, e.g., Lemuel Shaw's critical Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (Mass. 
1853), or Roger Brooke Taney's enormous majority opinion in Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). Thus, for the `second school' 
legal historian, the story of the development of law over time gives way to the 
comparatively more interesting story of the development of culture through 
means of law. For this historian, law is posited as an inherently dynamic force in 
the development and change—positive or negative—in the life of the culture it 
is ostensibly marshalled to serve. In this second school, then, laws are not 
merely `factual' but 'arti-factual'; this value-added is difficult to over-
appreciate. 
4 In the American context, this law-and-culture dance has gone on for years, 
in fact throughout the whole of American history. This is not surprising in a 
nation like our own that imagines itself in its most orthodox identity as a nation 
of 'laws and not men.' In such `rule of law' nations, private conflicts inevitably 
morph into legal problems and, in this form, become artifacts of great value and 
interest for legal historians and others. 
5 The intellectual energy behind this concept of `preference' and 
`deferment' is more straightforward than might initially appear. The legal 
historian understands that the distillation of personal or communal conflicts into 
legal problems comes about when the opposing parties turn to the formal, public 
processes of law for resolution of their often essentially private conflict. In these 
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A familiar example from American history may serve to 
elucidate and underscore the configuring truth contended for here. 
Having treatied their aboriginal territory from a high water mark of 
ninety million acres6 to a patch of land no more than a tenth that 
size in the northwestern corner of Georgia, the Cherokee Nation by 
1830 found even this small homeland threatened by their 
recalcitrant treaty partner, the untrustworthy, varying leadership of 
the state of Georgia.7 At this late date, however, they decided not 
to seek remedy by returning to the treaty table that had so 
consistently betrayed them before, but turned instead to the 'white 
man's law' through an orthodox, hyper-American process and 
venue: suit in original jurisdiction before the United States 
Supreme Court.8 Engaging the services of Daniel Webster himself, 
among others, and armed with a case they simply could not lose,9 
situations the parties have agreed to some level of formal arbitration toward 
settlement of the conflicts, with 'law' being accepted and empowered as arbiter. 
In essence the law will effectively prefer one of the conflicting parties—raise 
up, empower and legitimate one—while necessarily deferring the other, with 
corresponding opposite consequences. Whether on a micro or a macro level (and 
historians well understand that the most sweeping cultural changes can derive 
from the smallest of legal decisions), this final act of preference and deferment 
creates dynamic social change, giving 'life' to the law and its outcomes, for the 
law-in-history scholar. 
6 At the time of original English settlement in the 'New World,' Cherokee 
Nation territory covered what is now most of West Virginia and the western tip 
of Virginia, the western third of North Carolina, the western half of South 
Carolina, the entire north third of Georgia, the northern piece of Alabama and 
virtually all of Tennessee and Kentucky. By a continual series of forced cessions 
commencing with the Treaty of Holston in 1791, in which the Cherokee were 
promised perpetual autonomy and independence in their carefully bounded 
remainder by President Washington himself, they found themselves continually 
challenged within their steadily dwindling residual regularly thereafter. See 
generally THE CHEROKEE INDIAN NATION: A TROUBLED HISTORY (Duane H. 
King ed., Univ. of Tennessee Press 1979), and THE CHEROKEE NATION: A 
HISTORY (Robert J. Conley, Univ. of New Mexico Press 2005). 
7 Georgia's history of solemnly treating and then quickly breaking the 
pledge with the Cherokee and other native peoples became so notorious that the 
Indian treatiers came to refer to the tangible outcomes of these negotiations as 
"talking leaves." Sardonically, Indians noted that whenever the 'inviolable' 
treaties no longer suited the American signatories, they would blow away, like 
so many talking leaves. See generally http://ngeorgia.com/history/alphabet.html.  
8 Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 1 (1831). 
9 Rudimentary constitutional procedure clearly favored the Cherokee in this 
dispute. As their claim to territorial sovereignty and inviolability rested squarely 
on a treaty with the United States, in any dispute with contravening acts of a 
petit legislature, as was the case here with their defendant disputants, the 
`Supremacy Clause' of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI) mandated a result 
preferring the treaty over the petit-legislation, as 'supreme.' U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
The language of Article VI was unequivocal in this way: "This Constitution, and 
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named plaintiff and named defendant went before law to seek 
resolution regarding their difficult, important problem. Mr. Chief 
Justice John Marshall's famous preference and deference on behalf 
of the near unanimous majority in that case ineluctably affected 
both litigants and nation in the form of explosive expansion of the 
`Georgia Gold Rush,' on the one hand,1° and the nu na hi du na do 
hi lu 1,11 on the other.12 
If the contended-for premise is accepted as relevant and true, a 
related premise naturally follows for the law-in-history' legal 
historian: metaphysically, "the past is not the past . . . [i]t is the 
context."13 In this school of legal history, there is an organic link 
the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id. Within 
that reality, the very opening sentence of Chief Justice Marshall's famous 
opinion makes the point fully: 
This bill is brought by the Cherokee nation, praying an 
injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the execution 
of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to 
annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for 
the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been 
assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties 
repeatedly made and still in force. 
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1. 
10 The great Chief Justice wrote the still remarkable opinion for the majority 
of the bench, as was his iron-fisted custom in all cases 'of moment.' Through 
separate opinions, he was joined by Mr. Justice William Thompson and Mr. 
Justice Henry Baldwin. Native New Yorker and experienced Indian man Mr. 
Justice Smith Thompson dissented, in "[a]rguably . . [his] finest opinion . . ." 
and certainly his most important. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 872 (James W. Ely, Jr. and Joel B. Grossman 
eds., Oxford Press 2005) (1992). He was joined in dissent by the famous Mr. 
Justice Joseph Story. 
11 "The trail on which we cried..." or, familiarly, the 'trail of tears'." 
12 Begun in 1828 by a South Carolinian kicking a North Georgia rock and 
finding gold in it, or a North Carolina prospector finding gold in a North 
Georgia creek, or a Georgian and/or his slave finding it in another such creek in 
North Georgia, all of the probably apocryphal stories had three things in 
common that were accurate at some level and deeply troublesome for the 
Cherokee: gold, 'white' persons, and the duly treated and supposedly sacrosanct 
Cherokee territory. By 1831, unauthorized fortune seekers in that territory 
numbered from 4,000 to upwards of 15,000 prospectors and, as matters turned 
out after the notorious Cherokee Nation case, Cherokee presence in their own 
treated territory was effectively no more. See generally DAVID WILLIAMS, THE 
GEORGIA GOLD RUSH: TWENTY-NINERS, CHEROKEES, AND GOLD FEVER (Univ. 
of South Carolina Press, 1993). 
13 We have this from contemporary Canadian essayist and political 
philosopher John Ralston Saul. John Ralston Saul, Inaugural LaFontaine-
Baldwin Lecture, in A DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY 2-3 (Rudyard Griffiths ed., 
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between significant present day events and a discrete, discernible 
past—often a past involving law at some visceral level. Legal 
history posits a more or less distinct line tethering past law-related 
events to present realities, and legal historians make it their 
professional life's work to trace out those links, their connections, 
and their consequences. In this way 'the past' becomes a unique 
resource for present-ist social thinkers; in understanding the 
historical roots of present-day controversies, the inquiring culture 
gains deeper understandings of the 'why' of the problem, and the 
`what' of effective solutions, through appreciation of its discrete 
contextual past. This is the hope, at least, and the very best use and 
highest calling of the art of legal history, and the craft of the legal 
historian. 
One of the very best examples of these twin intellectual 
concepts in living action, individually and in tandem, came straight 
from relatively recent headlines, and the modest little community 
of Jena, Louisiana. We are all popularly familiar with the recent 
past events dragging the tiny settlement of 3,000 persons from 
rural obscurity into international prominence, and so only the 
barest recitation of the events in question is necessary here. On the 
2006). The full flavor of this important thought is better set out in the breadth of 
the quote: 
But the past is not the past. It is the context. The past 
memory—is one of the most powerful, practical tools 
available to a civilized democracy. There is a phrase that has 
been used over the centuries by various writers in various 
countries: History is an unbroken line from the past through 
the present into the future. It reminds us of our successes and 
failures, of their context; it warns us, encourages us. Without 
memory we are a society suffering from advanced 
Alzheimer's, tackling each day like a baby with its finger 
stuck out before the flames. 
Id. Saul's meaning here is plain, and it continues to impress me as the clearest 
statement implicating at the deepest level the sought-after and hoped-for 
practical value of the legal historian's work. More to the point, in my 
professional 	 view, 	 it 	 is 	 profoundly 	 true. 
http://www.powersource.com/cocinc/history/trail.htm. Interestingly, context is a 
term of art in the academic field of archeology, describing an event in time that 
has been physically preserved by the archeological record. This would seem to 
offer a compatible application of the term in purely historical circumstances. 
The careful reader will appreciate the difference between the present preferred 
phrase—and its meaning contended for here—and the famous Shakespearean 
aphorism, "[the] past is prologue . . . ." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST 
act 2, sc. 2 (more fully, "Whereof what's past is prologue, what to come in yours 
and my discharge . . . ."). The latter makes a point very different than the one at 
the heart of Saul's observation, and, in any event, beside the point contended for 
here. Thanks are due to my well-read brother-in-law, Daniel Richard, for this 
valuable lead. 
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morning of September 1, 2006, for reasons that have resisted full 
discovery,14 several nooses were found hanging from a tree in front 
of Jena High School, an integrated school of some 500-plus 
students in Jena, Louisiana. I5 This occurred the day after a black 
student had publicly asked the principal in a school assembly 
whether he could sit under the tree, usually an informal gathering 
place for white students to the general exclusion of the black 
students.I6 The events ensuing, including perceived lenient 
treatment of the responsible students,' interracial fights 
14 The fact that nooses were found hanging from the tree is established: at 
least two and possibly three, according to conflicting reports. National Public 
Radio reporter Wade Goodwyn reported "three nooses hanging from the shade 
tree in the courtyard," while Associated Press reporter Todd Lewan pointedly 
put the number at "[t]wo nooses . . . not three . . . ." See Wade Goodwyn, 
Beating Charges Split La. Along Racial Lines, N.P.R., Jul. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12353776, and Todd 
Lewan, Black and White Becomes Gray in La. Town, A.P., Sep. 22, 2007 
available 	 at 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2007Sep22/0,4675,APla.ceCall 
edJena,00.html. While it is reasonably assumed that they appeared for 
essentially racial reasons, one report suggests that their presence was in fact a 
prank aimed at white members of a school athletic team. Craig Franklin, Media 
Myths About the Jena 6, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2007, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1024/p09s01-coop.html. What is 
clear is the racial meaning assigned to the symbol by members of both racial 
communities, regardless of countervailing practical intention and the ensuing 
conflagration. 
15 At the time in question, the racial profile of the consolidated high school 
was approximately eighty percent white and ten percent black, with various 
other ethnic categories managing the remainder. http://www.city-
data.com/city/Jena-Louisiana.html. While this does qualify as an 'integrated 
school,' the demographic profile is nevertheless telling. 
16 Far from atypical in erstwhile integrated educational settings in America, 
each racial group apparently tended to keep close company with its own in the 
Jena high school setting. Black students tended to congregate on bleachers near 
a school auditorium, while the tree, apparently known colloquially as the 'white 
tree' or the 'prep tree,' was a gathering place for white students. 
17 Initially, the three white students responsible for the nooses were 
recommended for expulsion by the school principal, though that 
recommendation was overruled by the LaSalle Parish Board of Education, 
which action was supported by School Superintendent Roy Breithaupt. In 
justifying his decision to interested parents at that time, most particularly to the 
African-American parents challenging his leniency, he summed up his sense of 
the animus behind the action with the simple phrase, "Adolescents play pranks . 
. . ." Howard Witt, Racial Demons Rear Heads, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 2007, §1, at 
3. It was initially reported that the offending students received three days 'in-
school' suspension for their actions, further aggravating parents interested in 
swift, substantial punishment in consequence, though it appears the ultimate 
response was, in fact, harsher. See Wade Goodwyn's report, supra note 14. 
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following, I8 including a particular attack by six black students—
the 'Jena 6'—on one white student,I9 and the harsh prosecutorial 
response thereto,2° with widespread public protests resulting, make 
up the substance of the 'Jena 6' incident. 
It does not take a trained historical eye to see in this 
contemporary incident vestiges of America's tortured racial past, 
and the direct, strong, linear connection between that past and this 
present; indeed, each distinct phase of African-America's hyper-
difficult interface with the American story is symbolized in this 
contemporary tragedy. In the tough stance of the District 
Attorney—the Law—both before the attack2I and afterward, we 
see vestiges of America's awful slavery past: the master class 
reacting swiftly and decisively in the face of perceived dangerous 
18 A rash of "interracial fights" immediately followed the noose incident, 
prompting the school principal to invite LaSalle Parish District Attorney J. Reed 
Walters to address an all-school assembly on September 6, 2006, some four days 
after the event. See Elaine McKewon's report, Jena Six Timeline, LOUISIANA 
DAILY NEWS, Sep. 21, 2007, and see Jason Whitlock, Jena 6 Case Caught Up in 
Whirlwind of Distortion, Opportunism, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sep. 29, 2007, at 
B11 
19 On December 4, 2006 a seventeen-year-old Jena high school student was 
attacked at school by six black students, bloodied and suffering a loss of 
consciousness at some point. He was treated at the local hospital emergency 
room and released, with facial swelling, bruises, and concern about a possible 
concussion. He was able to attend a school function that evening, though he left 
early due to discomfort. 
20 The six students were immediately expelled from high school. Five— 
ages sixteen, seventeen, seventeen, seventeen, and eighteen—were charged with 
attempted second-degree murder. The sixteen-year-old was tried and convicted 
in adult court and was facing up to twenty-two years in prison at the time of the 
intervening public protest; he eventually pled guilty to the reduced charge of 
battery (clearly resulting from the protests) and received an eighteen-month 
sentence (less time served) to be served in a Louisiana State juvenile facility. 
The others faced reduced charges in adult court. The sixth student, aged 
fourteen, faced charges as a juvenile. See generally 
http://cbslltv.com/politics/jena.6.mychal.2.507349.html.  
21 At the school assembly called in the immediate wake of interracial strife 
following the noose display, the command speaker, District Attorney Walters, 
made the following unfortunate pronouncements: "I can be your best friend or 
your worst enemy. With the stroke of a pen I can make life miserable on you or 
ruin your life." Jason Whitlock, Jena 6 Case Caught Up in Whirlwind of 
Distortion, Opportunism, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 30, 2007, at B11. While 
Walters later denied that the remarks were directed at the black students, the 
students reported that he was looking directly at them when the remarks were 
made and, in any event, the students believed that to be the case. Apart from its 
affected hyperbole, one can easily find the 'master's' unmitigated voice of 
careless power familiarly addressing any insolence of the controlled class. That 
certainly appears to have been the view of the students in this regard. 
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servant class insolence.22 The noose speaks symbolically of 
America's dark post-bellum Reconstruction past, of course—its 
evil 'Jim Crow' phase—when literally thousands of African-origin 
Americans came under the vicious, extra-legal care of feckless and 
bloodthirsty mobs, at awful personal and communal cost.23 The 
late response of the thousands descending on Jena in the aftermath 
of the first trial of Mychal Bell brought instant memories of 
America's mid-twentieth century period—its Civil Rights period—
in all its energy, pathos and glory. 
If the best work of history consists in developing palpable, 
rational, present-day answers to interesting historical questions, 
then the most compelling question to be answered in the 'Jena 6' 
controversy is the most obvious: how did such a comparatively 
minor incident grow into the major international controversy it 
became? And in this question we see the value of the work to 
which the discrete sub-discipline of legal history is committed. For 
the question cannot begin to be satisfactorily addressed without 
close reference to the incidents of the past discussed above: the key 
seasons of African-American's troubled relationship with the 
American experiment, seasons effectually wrapped in law at every 
turn. It is in more fully appreciating both the relevant legal past 
and its key practical and even spiritual touch-points with the 
present as reified in the 'Jena 6' controversy, that the question 
finds its rest in the relevant context of history. Specifically, legal 
history is singularly suited to recovering the influence of that past 
22 And this, with an arbitrariness that abrogates the rule of law and, indeed, 
menacingly marginalizes it. In his "I can . . . ruin your life" invective, vestiges 
of a law of whim and convenience in active opposition to the rule of law would 
not have been lost on the African-American hearers at least. See id 
23 In this period, countless numbers of African-Americans were subject to 
mob attacks decidedly outside the protective reach of the 'rule of law,' and 
upwards of 3,500 fell victim to extralegal murder during a forty-year period 
beginning in the 1880s, by necessarily unofficial count. The famous Tuskegee 
Institute report on lynching put the figures at 3,437 for African Americans (1952 
NEGRO YEARBOOK 275-279 (Jessie P. Guzman ed., 1952)), a figure considered 
to be conservative by some historians. Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: 
Lynching and Race Riots in the United States, 1880-1950, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curricultun/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html. We short-
form these violent, illegal actions as 'lynchings,' but this short-form has the 
natural tendency to somewhat sanitize what was in fact a base and diabolical 
condition. A remarkable and important historical treatment preserves too well 
this grisly proto-American story. See generally PHILLIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS 
OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (Modern Library 
Edition 2003) (2002). 
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on this present, and uniquely prepared to imagine effective 
solutions to surviving present-day problems following.24 
But in order to fully accomplish this task—to more wholly 
appreciate the modern energy of 'Jena 6' from its relevant, 
influencing past—a further related premise must be added to the 
first two to fully close the historical loop and shed maximum light 
in the inquiry. More conjecture than axiom, hypothesis than proof, 
it is as simple in form and presentation as the others and as rich in 
complexity and intellectual nuance as they inevitably prove to be: 
jurisprudence matters. By jurisprudence, it is necessary for me to 
mean little more than the typical and well-accepted recoveries of 
that term: "[t]he philosophy of law, or the science which treats of 
the principles of positive law and legal regulations . . . ,"25 "the 
science of law . . . which has for its function to ascertain the 
principles on which legal rules are based . . . ,"26 "the philosopher's 
effort to understand the legal order and its role in human life . . . 
,
,927 toward the ultimate constructive end of "raising fundamental 
questions and seeking the truth . . . ."28 What is far more interesting 
and valuable, perhaps, is what is meant by the term matters as a 
qualifier of the concept word it succeeds. Rather than attempting to 
explain the connection here, in the abstract, I ask the reader's short 
24 I do not mean to suggest that legal history occupies a singular place in the 
useful task of truly understanding the 'Jena 6' incident. Indeed, each and every 
of the human social sciences has something to add to that task of understanding, 
from sociology to psychology to economics, to philosophy and beyond. 
However, the history relevant to this particular controversy is steeped in law in a 
particular way. The very institution of slavery itself was prototypically a legal 
institution, created by positive law and maintained across every nook and cranny 
of the land by jurisprudentially similar legal edifices. It is the sheer, frightening 
extra-legality of the out-of-doors actions of the 'lynch mob' in the 
Reconstruction era (and beyond) that gives the period its outrage and its cold 
chill. The very goal of the Civil Rights era as a measurable solution to legally 
buttressed racism in post-World War II America was to fight law with law, 
seeking to trump the positive law of American apartheid with its jurisprudential 
better and master: the natural law of the human experience. Thus, while each 
social science has its rightful mode of inquiry into this controversy, given the 
particular related circumstances, legal history may have just a bit more to add. 
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 993 (4th ed. 1968). 
26 THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1031 (Clifford Walsh ed., 1959). 
27 READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY iii (Morris R. 
Cohen & Felix Cohen eds., 1951). Within this definitional context, the Cohens 
rightly reference Oliver Wendell Holmes's evocative incantation of philosophy 
as a determined effort "No see so far as one may, and to feel, the great forces 
that are behind every detail . . . ." Id. This observation applies with all the 
greater vigor to legal philosophy, or jurisprudence, and is especially applicable 
to the present project. 
28 JURISPRUDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (1993). 
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indulgence while I instead elucidate the relationship by showing it, 
in the context of the problem set out above central to this study; the 
reader's attention is especially drawn to 'Act III' in this regard. 
For purposes of the present, it will be the modest goal of this 
paper to consider the twenty-first century American incident not 
against the panoply of African-American/American history, but 
rather against but one piece of it: 'Jena 6' and American slavery.29 
Specifically, I would like to explore the broad stresses of that 
particular history on this event, considering the way in which the 
energy of the one may have influenced the shape of the other, 
though I will approach this task from a very particular direction. 
While it is intellectually legitimate to consider the details of any 
imagined connection between the contemporary 'Jena 6' 
controversy and America's slavery history, it is my desire here 
instead to explore that relationship in its negative rather than its 
positive. Clearly the very influences of our discrete slavery past are 
not difficult to imagine or see reflected in the present details of the 
`Jena 6' controversy. But how might Jena have looked against a 
parallel historical backdrop, a backdrop of un-slavery, if you will? 
While our historical slavery past 'is what it is,' as with any 
history, it is/was very 'thin' in places, very susceptible to great 
changes—counter-histories—at the variance of relatively small 
things. Keeping the contemporary 'Jena 6' event in mind, I would 
like to consider three of those 'thin points' in the edifice of our 
slavery history—places where its life as a foundation-stone of the 
dystopic American slavery story was very much in the balance—
and to ask naturally following questions, about Jena and beyond. It 
should be made clear that I do not intend to engage in an 
essentially counter-factual exercise: how would a 'different' 
slavery history have affected the 'Jena 6' events?30 Rather, it is my 
desire to use the 'alternative histories' chronicled and explored 
herein to highlight the gossamer-thin strands by which any nation's 
history is ultimately woven together, for better and for worse. If I 
am successful, I believe that interesting consequences of this 
`negative history' will naturally present themselves, relating to the 
29 I should note here that the panel on which this paper was originally 
delivered owes a real debt of thanks to Professor Donald Tibbs of the Drexel 
University Earle Mack School of Law for the intellectual energy behind the 
concept. As an exercise in 'active' legal history, it has been very interesting 
tracing a contemporary dilemma through the various vestiges of its historical 
roots, and I am grateful to Professor Tibbs for the 'good idea' and the 
opportunity of being even a small part of its realization. 
3° Indeed, if I am successful in fully exploring the `un-histories' at the 
center of the present story, I will have much bigger fish to fry than those 
produced by anti-intellectual counterfactuals alone. 
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`Jena 6' tableaux, helping to place the present-day phenomenon in 
a compelling historical past. 
With that in mind, this work will highlight three key moments 
in the passion play of America's slavery history, arguably 
reflecting on the much later 'Jena 6' affair. The first—or 'Act I', if 
you will, carries us back to America's turbulent eighteenth century 
revolutionary days, involving what would become the most sacred 
of the icons marking the character of its civil religion. Act II 
moves us forward almost a decade from the first, highlighting an 
incident less familiar than that anchoring Act I, but no less 
important in the slavery history of this nation or the shadows it 
casts across the face of Jena, Louisiana, centuries thereafter. Act 
III brings the before-mentioned issue of jurisprudence directly to 
the fore, where, through the ministrations of famous western late-
Enlightenment political philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke, we may consider how such jurisprudence might 'matter', as 
reflected in the Jena affair. Each act will be directly grounded in 
the 'Jena 6' history, with naturally following consequences being 
explored in conclusion. 
II. SLAVERY AND JENA: PRESENT . . . AND PAST 
A. Act I.: "to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce 
"31 
The counter-intuition of prosecuting a popular revolution on 
the reified truth of a natural right to individual liberty while 
maintaining anti-revolutionary, anti-natural human slavery was not 
lost to the eighteenth-century American mind. As early as 1768, 
revolutionary rhetoric in the form of a popular Massachusetts 
circular claimed "essential unalterable right[s] . . . sacred and 
irrevocable . . ." inuring to "the subjects within the realm . . ." 
logically including African-American 'subjects:32 English minister 
31 Thomas Jefferson, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, in A CASEBOOK ON THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 263 
(Robert Ginsberg ed., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1967) (1834) [hereinafter 
CASEBOOK]. 
32 This circular letter is referenced in EDWIN CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" 
BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79 (Cornell Univ. Press 
1955). To be sure, the rights being argued for in the circular, "natural and 
constitutional," were not directly connected to the human right to freedom and 
autonomy at the heart of the revolutionary slavery question, but rather were 
concerned with exclusive personalty rights against arbitrary infringement by the 
British Crown. Nevertheless, the intellectual heft undergirding the quote plainly 
applies to the situation in question, and that heft was firmly within the American 
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turned American Revolutionary John Allen wrote of "trifling 
patriots . . . advocates for the liberties of mankind . . . [while] 
continuing this . . . abominable practice of enslaving your fellow 
creatures . . . ."33 Medical doctor and Pennsylvania revolutionary 
hero Benjamin Rush (himself a signatory to the Declaration of 
Independence) noted, poetically, for his revolutionary 
contemporaries, "[t]he plant of liberty is of so tender a nature, that 
it cannot thrive long in the neighbourhood of slavery."34 It was 
against this very backdrop of erstwhile hypocrisy that the 
American Continental Congress itself pledged in 1774 to 
discontinue the African slave trade everywhere, formally living up 
to that pledge on April 6, 1776, when it voted "that no slaves be 
imported into any of the thirteen colonies . . . ."35  
Count the famous Thomas Jefferson himself among those 
taking special note of the uncompromised necessity of harmony in 
fledgling America's treatment of African-origin slavery in its midst 
against the backdrop of its war for liberation from 'slavery' under 
the British Crown. In instructions to the Virginia Delegation on the 
eve of the First Continental Congress, Jefferson self-consciously 
noted "the rights of human nature . . . [are] deeply wounded by this 
infamous practice . . ." of African slavery, and that "[t]he abolition 
of domestic slavery is the great object of desire . . ." among the 
colonies of America.36 Himself an owner of slaves and personally 
popular mind at that time, as illustrated by the quote. In point of fact, historian 
Philip Foner reminds us that "anti-slavery literature" and, by extension, the 
pristine jurisprudence undergirding it, "had been written in this country from the 
earliest colonial days." Philip S. Foner, African Slavery in America, in 2 THE 
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 15 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945). 
33 JOHN ALLAN, The Watchman's Alarm, referenced in BERNARD BAILYN, 
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 240 (1947) 
[hereinafter IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS]. In the same vein, include Puritan Minister 
Levi Hart, who put the matter rhetorically to the Revolutionary public in his 
pamphlet Liberty Described and Recommended (1775), when he noted 
America's business with "the unhappy Africans . . . enslave[d] . . . for life" and 
continued "For how, when the colonists themselves 'are the tyrants . . . ' could 
they plead for freedom [from England] . . . ? What inconsistence and self-
contradiction is this . . . ! When, 0 when shall the happy day come, that 
Americans shall be consistently engaged in the cause of liberty?" IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS at 243 (emphasis in the original). 
34 BENJAMIN RUSH, On Slave-Keeping (1773), reprinted in THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 17 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1967). While similar 
sentiments were not universal in the eighteenth-century American mind, they 
were certainly plentiful and regular. 
35 IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 33, at 246. 
36 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, 
August . . . , in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 421, 440 (Paul L. Ford 
ed., 1892). 
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caught in the clinging trap of the personal convenience of life there 
under, his opprobrium with the institution was nevertheless 
legendary, extending into both personal correspondence and public 
life. Simply put, if revolution-era Jefferson was an 'owner' of other 
human beings, his written reflection at least had him as an 
uncomfortable custodian of such, ideating and chronicling against 
the institution for himself and the nation he would practically help 
create. Thus, in drafting the hyper-famous aphorism in the most 
significant writing assignment of his life—"We hold these truths to 
be Self-evident; that all men are created equal . . ."—we can be 
satisfied that he meant it in its most expansive, naturalistic form. 
But perhaps more portentous even than this iconic aphorism 
are other words of Jefferson's—powerful words, consistent with 
his articulated convictions and drafted directly into the Declaration 
of Independence, though fated never to become a part of that great 
document. For among the catalogue of indiscretions of King 
George III necessitating the revolutionary response of the 
American colonies, the following unequivocal passage from 
Jefferson's draft Declaration was at least in the drafters' minds: 
[H]e has waged cruel war against human nature 
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & 
liberty in the persons of a distant people who never 
offended him, captivating & carrying them into 
slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable 
death in their transportation thither . . .37  
Jefferson shamed in his draft that these were "persons . . . 
people," not "property," who were being victimized in this 
"piratical warfare . . . of the CHRISTIAN King of Great Britain . . . 
," emphasizing both humanity and inhumanity by adding that the 
King was "determined to keep open a market where MEN should 
be bought & sold . . . ."38 Added to this awful work of the King 
was the fact that, in the face of the above, he "prostituted his 
negative for suppressing every [colonial] legislative attempt to 
prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce . . . ."39 Finally, 
37 CASEBOOK, supra note 31. 
38 1d. at 263. In examining Jefferson's handwritten draft of this document, it 
is clear that he went to considerable lengths in rendering the three-letter word 
MEN in the writing, making the letters of that word three or even four times the 
size of any other of the many letters in the draft, capitalized in his own unsteady 
hand. Without a doubt it was the single most dramatically emphasized word in 
the entire draft. 
39 1d. 
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"that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of 
distinguished die . . ," Jefferson closed his prose assault with what 
was to him the greatest indignity of all: 
[H]e is now exciting those very people to rise in 
arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of 
which he has deprived them, by murdering the 
people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus 
paying off former crimes committed against the 
liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges 
them to commit against the lives of another.4°  
Placing the whole jeremiad last, for added emphasis, in his 
drafted twenty-four-point parade of horribles against the King, and 
employing in it the most words and the most passionate language 
of any on the list,'" Jefferson had a two-fold agenda at least in 
adding this remarkable paragraph to his draft. First, he understood 
in his prescient way that such a document as the one he was 
drafting would garner great attention from the other interested 
`new world' European contestants. In this way, with this 
paragraph, he hoped to embarrass the King before that coterie, 
winning a victory to the colonies in the 'war of sympathies' 
inevitably accompanying the anticipated hot military war to come. 
Second, importantly, further anticipating victory in that expected 
war, Jefferson sought to co-opt the high ground of universal 
freedom for the nation coming forth, immediately consigning 
human slavery to its own pre-national history.42 However, 
Jefferson's best intentions on this critical point were destined to 
4° Id. at 264, emphasis in Thomas Jefferson's own hand. 
41 Id. The diatribe continued for 168 words and employed some of the most 
scathing and unequivocal phrasing of any in the entire draft document. The next 
longest pejorative paragraph in the list used fifty-three words. 
42 His own reality as a slaveholder notwithstanding, Thomas Jefferson's 
personal antipathy toward slavery was outstripped only by his fear of it in any 
fashion as an institution in the post-revolutionary republic he and many of his 
peers and contemporaries imagined. His actions in this regard were only a 
beginning. His efforts to limit the reality of human slavery in the American 
Republic were varied and intense, and expressed at every level of his personal 
and political influence, local, state, and national. Such a paragraph in its 
initiating Declaration would pronounce a first clear word on the difficult issue 
in favor of natural, universal human freedom. To the extent the document came 
to be revered as foundational to any nation emerging victorious from the 
revolution, that 'first word,' consistent with the natural law logic undergirding 
all of it, should prove a difficult one to ignore. This reality is exactly the thing 
for which Jefferson had played. 
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fall entirely unrealized, and a nation's history would be profoundly 
defined prior to its own national existence. 
When Jefferson's 'draught Declaration' came before the 
Continental Congress for review and consideration beginning July 
1, 1776,43 there was reason for some optimism regarding the anti-
slavery clause in question. Just the previous April—April 6, to be 
exact—the Congress had passed an omnibus anti-slave importation 
resolution, namely, "[t]hat no slaves be imported into any of the 
thirteen United Colonies."'" It was not a 'universal abolition' 
resolution, to be sure, and the all-but-assured motive behind its 
passage was Lord Dunmore's notorious Proclamation offer of 
pardon to "all indented servants, negroes, or others (appertaining 
to the rebels) . . . that are . . . willing to bear arms . . ." in the 
service of His Royal Majesty against their obstreperous, rebellious 
colonial masters.45 But there was in fact a good deal of true anti-
slavery sentiment in Revolutionary America, both in the 
Continental Congress and popularly abroad, and, given the 
centrality of Jefferson's universal equality concept in its preamble, 
morality and logic clearly lay on the side of its inclusion in the 
draft. However, as would prove to be the case with African-origin 
American slavery time and again thereafter, morality and logic 
43 Having taken under consideration a 'motion for independence' from 
Britain in its June 7, 1776 session, the Continental Congress four days later 
struck a committee of five to own the enormous task of drafting a suitable 
supporting document. Included in that Committee were no less colonial stars 
than Robert Livingston of New York, Connecticut's Roger Sherman, John 
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and the man to whom the drafting task ultimately 
fell, Thomas Jefferson. The 'Committee of Five' would report Jefferson's draft 
to the Congress on Friday, June 28, 1776, that body resolving itself into a 
`committee of the whole' on the following Monday, July 1, 1776, for 
deliberation and final approval. See generally DAVID HAWKE, A TRANSACTION 
OF FIVE MEN (1964), and PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997). 
" 4 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 258 (1776). 
45 Response to Lord Dunmore's Proclamation (Nov. 1775), in THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: WRITINGS FROM THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 82 (John 
Rhodehamel ed., 2001). Lord Dunmore's wartime stance regarding American 
`negroe' slaves particularly, and the vulnerability of the colonies to such 
mercenary emancipation tactics generally, was a matter of grave concern to the 
American Revolutionary brain trust in considering the details of the war. Given 
the very pragmatic political considerations, on both sides of the 'war equation,' 
around this question of African-American bondsmen and the Revolutionary 
War, this is all but assuredly the major impetus behind the actions of the 
Continental Congress around this issue. For historical support for this point, see 
JOHN M. LUDLOW, EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY: THE WAR OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE 1775 — 1783 118 (Longmans Green and Co. 1876). 
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would have precious little to do with politically motivated 
outcomes ultimately deciding the question. 
As the story of the excising of Jefferson's bold anti-slavery 
invective from the final draft of the Declaration has been told by 
virtually all of his major biographers, there is no need to recall it in 
detail here. No friend of the public vetting of any of his work, 
Jefferson sat among the debating delegates mostly in silence 
throughout the three difficult days of editing,46 though he was 
noted by his near seatmate, Dr. Franklin, to have been "writhing a 
little under the acrimonious criticisms of some of its parts . . . ."47  
He, himself, named "South Carolina and Georgia . . ." as the main 
culprits behind the clause's excision, "who had never attempted to 
restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still 
wished to continue it."48 Indeed, one member of the South Carolina 
delegation put the matter bluntly and ominously during the draft 
debate when he noted, with regard to Jefferson's anti-slavery 
Declaration piece, "[I]f property in slaves should be questioned 
there must be an end to confederation."49 This would have been 
received by the voting delegates as the threat it was intended to 
be,5° and, in any event, was a wrong first step for the fledgling, 
hopeful nation, by application of its own preamblic expression. 
And so what would soon become the greatest of American 
documentary icons was reported to a wondering world without the 
46 "As to myself, I thought it a duty to be, on that occasion, a passive auditor 
of the opinions of others, more impartial judges than I could be, of . . . [the 
Declaration's] merits or demerits." 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 268 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904-5) (1899). 
47 Id. In another place, he would describe the editing process and his 
reaction to it more acerbically, and probably more forthrightly, calling the edits 
themselves "depredations on. . . parts of the instrument . . . ." and, of himself in 
that regard, "I was not insensible to these mutilations . . ." Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Robert Walsh (December 4, 1818), in 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 120. 
48 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 36, at 28. Jefferson did not end his critique there. He 
added as well, "[o]ur northern brethren also . . . felt a little tender under those 
censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had 
been pretty considerable carriers of them to others." Id. 
49 LUDLOW, supra note 45, at 213. 
5° The logistics of war being then what they always are, England would 
necessarily have been in the market for friendly colonial American ports to 
harbor their navy and materially support their foreign war efforts. Though South 
Carolina and Georgia were of the least of value to England among the pre-
revolutionary American colonies by almost any measure, the deep-water ports of 
Charleston and Savannah alone would have been incalculable, and the 
corresponding detriment to the colonial war effort would have been enormous. 
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most ambitious of its intended social sanctions. In later describing 
his ultimate goal in drafting the document as he did, Thomas 
Jefferson the visionary noted plainly that, "it was intended to be an 
expression of the American mind . . ."5 I to the interested world. 
Sadly, in its edited state, it was. In a bargain based in too many 
dollars and too little sense,52 America imagined in the 
Declaration's soaring preamble the world's first republican 
democracy based in universal, individual freedom; through its 
callous, politically-based excision, it effectively embraced the 
hypocrisy of human slavery as a cornerstone of that republic. 
While the disciplines of history will not allow me to imagine the 
ways our nation may have changed in the face of a different result 
on this issue, it does not take an historian to imagine that things 
would have changed, even down to the 'Jena 6' incident, had that 
result been different.53  
51 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 
8, 1825), THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 343. 
52 It has become historically elementary to suggest that the visceral energy 
driving America's complex interaction with African-origin human slavery, 
either in eighteenth century abolitionism or expansion, was not sociologic or 
political or moral or psychogenic or any other such condition, but rather, at its 
core, economic. Interestingly enough, a combination of environmental harshness 
of the 'slavery' territories as well as a genetic fitness of sorts on the part of the 
African-origin persons held in bondage to slavery aided in the particular form of 
slavery taking hold in the section of America that it did. To describe South 
Carolina and Georgia at the close of the eighteenth century as little more than 
malarial swamps is only slightly too harsh, given the extreme lack of broad 
social and physical infrastructure in either place. To 'tame the land' they were 
heavily depending on labor they felt they needed but imagined they could not 
afford, and, in the epidemiological course of things, the African happened to be 
more suited to the disease climate than the white European. Particularly, the 
genetic recessive of the debilitating and potentially deadly 'sickle cell anemia' is 
a condition known as `sicklemia; ' asymptomatic in all but the most extreme 
environmental circumstances, it bestows upon its carrier, for the relatively 
benign dissipations it requires, an almost complete immunity to malaria. Thus, 
in a twist on a ridiculous theme, African-American slavery was not based in 
imagined physical and genetic inferiority to the white race but instead, 
effectively at one level at least, in practical genetic superiority. And so the states 
took advantage of this preference without paying for it, choosing to steal the 
labor of hundreds of thousands of persons in order to prosecute their desire and 
plan fully to exploit their land. 
53 This notion will be further explored, of course, in conclusion. 
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B. Act II: "the fate of millions unborn . . . "54 
The second act in our three-act tragedy stars Thomas Jefferson 
again, in a different role along the same lines of his dramatic tour 
de force in Act I. This act is set eight years after the first, in 1784, 
under very changed circumstances from the first act, in 1776. The 
ragtag group of colonies boldly declaring independence against the 
world superpower across the Atlantic Ocean, then, has given way 
to a young nation, thirteen states in federal union, occupying its 
own land and under its own constituting document, the Articles of 
Confederation. They are a nation with many problems, to be 
sure,55 but they are indeed a nation, having nominally defeated 
their former colonial masters and then charting an unsteady but 
54 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Observations on the Article Etats-Unis Prepared 
for the Encyclopedie, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., 1894). 
55 The problems facing the upstart nation under its initial configuring 
document were then legion, and have since become historically legendary. 
Heroes of the Revolution wrote more or less openly to one another of the 
disaster the nation had become under its Articles of Confederation. John Jay 
summed up government affairs under the Articles in a letter to George 
Washington, noting, dramatically, "Our affairs seem to lead to some crisis, some 
revolution—something that I cannot foresee or conjecture. I am uneasy and 
apprehensive; more so, than during the war . . . . [W]e are going and doing 
wrong . . . ." 4 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter from John Jay to George 
Washington (June 27, 1786), in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 
(CONFEDERATION SERIES) 131 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1995). In a response to 
Secretary Jay, Washington acknowledged the 'crisis' then before the new nation, 
adding, "What astonishing changes a few years are capable of producing . . . 
[w]hat a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that we are incapable of 
governing ourselves . . . ." 28 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter from George 
Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs (August 1, 1786), in THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745 –
1799 503 (1938). Washington was even more pessimistic in correspondence 
with Henry Lee, lamenting that, "mankind when left to themselves are unfit for 
their own Government. I am mortified beyond expression when I view the 
clouds that have spread over the brightest morn that ever dawned upon any 
Country." 29 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter from George Washington to Henry 
Lee (Oct. 31, 1786) in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE 
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799 33-4 (1938). To James Madison, 
George Washington made the matter plainer still: "Thirteen Sovereignties 
pulling against each other, and all tugging at the fcederal head will soon bring 
ruin to the whole . . . ." 29 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter from George 
Washington to James Madison (November 5, 1786), in THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799 
52. Alexander Hamilton made an itemized list of inadequacies and failures 
under the Articles a key part of the Federalist argument supporting the draft 
Constitution of 1787. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 15 82ff, in THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS 72 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009) (1788). 
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ambitious course as a sovereign power in the panoply of 
international communities. And, having passed on their first, best 
opportunity at harmonizing their internal institutions with their 
external professions, outlined above, they remained at that moment 
a nation founded on individual liberty, struggling with human 
slavery.56 
Having lost his gallant fight to set the nation on the right foot at 
its outset regarding the lamentable institution, Thomas Jefferson's 
public efforts in this direction were far from over. He is popularly 
known to have been a very enigmatic man with regard to the 
institution in the American character and in his own life. Privately, 
he was a slave owner, of course, and a deeply committed one at 
that: he both bought and sold human beings—some fifty or so sold 
between 1784 and 1794, in part to satisfy creditors57—and lived a 
life of comfort and ease, "in the grand style of a Virginia aristocrat, 
a style that put many European aristocrats to shame . . . ,"58 all 
from purloined African labor.59 Though to observe him in his 
private life "one would hardly have supposed. . . that Jefferson felt 
the slightest repugnance to slavery . . . , "60 he was negative about 
"[t]his abomination . . ."61 in his personal correspondence, even 
56 On the one hand the Articles of Confederation worked a nominal upgrade 
in the general condition of the 'negro' in America (employing the eighteenth 
century descriptive of choice), by omission if nothing else. ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION, Article V extended "all privileges and immunities of free 
citizens" to all "free inhabitants" of the nation, "paupers, vagabonds and 
fugitives from justice excepted[.]" By non-exception, then, 'free Negros' were 
included. Negros were not excluded from holding federal office under the 
Articles themselves. See Art. V, allowing for appointment of "delegates . . . 
annually . . . as the legislatures of each State shall direct . . . ." However, state 
military quotas were set "in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in 
such state . . . ." Art. IX. And, of course, there was no direct addressing of the 
`slavery question' anywhere in its prescriptions. And so, even through the 
Articles period, the foundational conundrum of individual freedom and human 
slave7 remained. 
5 JOHN CHESTER MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON 
AND SLAVERY 107 (1991). Apparently—and interestingly—Jefferson made 
efforts to conceal his part in these transactions by conducting them through a 
third party. 
58 Id. 
59 Jefferson ran the great-house of Monticello and a combined estate 
numbered at approximately 10,000 acres at its height, complete with an army of 
artisans—carpenters, bricklayers, cabinetmakers, blacksmiths, etc., and house 
persons, servants, hostlers, coachmen and grooms (not to mention agricultural 
service persons)—almost entirely from stolen human labor. 
60 MILLER, supra note 57, at 110. 
61 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge 
(July 14, 1787), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 410. 
The full quote nicely captures one aspect of Jefferson's polarity of extremes 
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down to the very last known written letter of his life.62 And his 
public mind on the matter, including continued efforts to set it on 
the wane in the developing life of the new nation he would lead 
and serve in so many ways, was legendary. 
In the spring of 1784 Jefferson again found himself a 
Congressman, this time representing Virginia federally under the 
Articles of Confederation. His chance to revisit the slavery 
question on the national level came with his administrative 
assignment to draft an Ordinance for the orderly management of 
U.S. Territories at that time. As a consequence of their victorious 
position in the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 closing the 
Revolutionary War, the new nation fell heir to the residual land 
claims of the British Empire west of the Allegheny/Appalachian 
mountain ridge, through to the Mississippi River. This was an 
enormous land mass and, once under federal control, would be 
used to establish states additional to the thirteen original of the 
United States, adding greatly to the resources and 'might' of the 
young nation. Jefferson was appointed to draft an Ordinance for 
the orderly transition of this territory into anticipated states, and he 
approached the task with his usual energy and attention to detail.63  
regarding the institution: "This abomination must have an end, and there is a 
superior bench reserved in heaven for those who hasten it." 
62 Writing to Roger C. Weightman in 1826, but ten days before his 
impending death on the upcoming July 4, Jefferson talked of his wistful but 
impossible desire to be in Washington D.C. among friends on that Independence 
Day. He then wrote appropriately about the Declaration itself, tying it one last 
time to the unrequited promise of universal freedom that for him it still held: 
May [the Declaration] be to the world, what I believe it will 
be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the 
signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which 
monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to 
bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of 
self-government . . . . All eyes are opened, or opening, to the 
rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has 
already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the 
mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their 
backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride 
them legitimately, by the grace of God. 
10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman 
(June 24, 1826), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 
391-92. 
63 Jefferson anticipated ten states at least out of the territory in question 
and, typical of his fastidious approach to such assignments, he even proposed 
names for the anticipated states, including: Assenisippia, Cherronesus, Illinoia, 
Metropotamia, Michigania, Pelisipia, Polypotamia, Saratoga, Sylvania, and 
Washington. 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, III. Report of the Committee, 1 Mch. 1784, 
in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 603-605 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952). Two 
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In this instance, Jefferson's abolition plan was thoughtful and 
simple, and had in its favor a benignity which eschewed the direct 
and caustic confrontation of his Declaration approach in favor of a 
quieter and more indirect campaign against the institution. Slavery 
had been officially abolished in Vermont seven years prior, and by 
negative prescription in Massachusetts through a broad reading of 
its Declaration of Rights only one year before, and was then a 
topic of energetic conversation in all of the northern states. As the 
territory in question girded the thirteen states generally and the 
four southern states in particular, from the Gulf of Mexico to the 
49th parallel, the right approach to the task could leave slavery 
geographically, politically and indeed metaphysically marooned in 
its then present borders, being left to die an anticipated natural 
death in time by such isolation.64 The key, of course, was to ensure 
the admission of the expected states as 'non-slave' states, and 
survived in amended form, of course, and the tribute intended for America's 
`first citizen' and first President would survive intact, first designating the 
nation's capital after Constitutional ratification, and denominating the nation's 
forty-second state in 1889, a little more than 100 years after Jefferson's 
suggestion. 
64 Jefferson counted on several cross-currents endemic of human nature and 
community identity and development to ground his ultimate expectations 
regarding the end of American slavery by this means. First, in limiting the 
institution to its four major southern outlets among the original thirteen—
Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia—it would be effectively out-
posted there, with no other place to express itself in the nation. As the nation 
grew, those originals would be further and further isolated from the whole, and 
that by a universally acknowledged negative rather than a positive. Peer energy 
alone would have a strong ameliorating, harmonizing effect on these states 
where human slavery survived. There was the accompanying 'shame' factor as 
well, the remaining 'slave' states being forced to consider their continued 
deliberate reliance on a morally questionable institution (in its best light), and in 
the face of its repudiation across the breadth of even the newest entrants to the 
democratic cause. Finally, several strong political outcomes might be expected 
to have exerted their own unique pressures on the isolated, remaining 'slave' 
states. First, in the expected influx of immigration adding directly to the wealth 
of the nation, the wage/labor bargain would be the magnet pulling such labor to 
the new nation from around the world. To the extent a state filled its 
infrastructural need through uncompensated stolen labor, it would receive 
virtually no part of that residual, and would shrink in comparison. Second, given 
the cost of outfitting and maintaining the naval resources necessary to ply and 
affect the trade, it is difficult to imagine the whole nation continuing to 
cheerfully bear the cost of the trade from which, arguably, only a fragment of its 
fellow members 'benefited.' And with no market to receive the growing product 
from both natural means and diabolical Southern state breeding outcomes, what 
were those few isolated states to do? For these and a host of reasons both 
practical and creative, Jefferson was hopeful for such an outcome from such a 
decision by Congress. 
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Jefferson was not prepared to leave this critical detail to individual 
and serendipitous chance. And so, as a final clause to his draft 
Ordinance of 1784 coming before Congress for approval that 
spring, he added the following simple, portentous words: "5. That 
after the year 1800 of the Christian sera, there shall be neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the . . . states, otherwise 
than in punishment of crimes . ."65  
The Ordinance along with its momentous clause came before 
Congress for review and final consideration on April 19, 1784. 
According to the constitutional protocol of the day, votes were 
tallied under the Articles of Confederation not by individual 
delegates but rather by voting delegations, the sum total of 
delegates from a particular state formulating that state's delegation 
in Congress. As each state represented in this plan one single vote, 
Jefferson needed but seven of the thirteen delegated votes to carry 
the day, eliminating slavery from the territories in question in 
perpetuity, and hastening an end of slavery everywhere in the new 
nation. Severed from the remainder of the draft Ordinance and 
voted on separately, on account of its controversy and singular 
importance, the clause received six of the seven needed 
affirmatives,66 and would have garnered the prayed for seventh but 
for the voice of one single delegate from New Jersey, suddenly and 
unexpectedly ill in bed at the time of the vote.67 The Congressional 
65 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Ordinance of 1784 (Draft), in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 432. 
" The states voting unanimously in favor of inclusion of the abolition 
clause in the Ordinance were: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania. Maryland, Virginia and South 
Carolina voted in favor of its exclusion, though the Virginia delegation was not 
unanimous, with the positive vote of Thomas Jefferson himself. North Carolina 
was divided, Richard Dobbs Spaight voting against it and Jefferson's good 
friend Hugh Williamson voting in favor. That left New Jersey, a vote Jefferson 
was right to have counted on, but for the one delegate who was ill and away 
from the floor at voting. 
67 That 'one vote' belonged to John Beatty, one of two delegates 
representing New Jersey in the Congress. A graduate of the College of New 
Jersey (now Princeton), he was a veteran of the Revolutionary Army, attaining 
the rank of Major by war's end. He practiced medicine in Princeton, NJ 
thereafter, until his election to the New Jersey State Council, where he served 
for two years. In 1784 he was appointed as one of two New Jersey delegates to 
the Federal Congress, and it was in this capacity that the momentous question 
fell to him and his fellow Congressional delegates. He would represent New 
Jersey in the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and 
would go on to a storied public career in politics, education, and business before 
his death, mere weeks before that of Thomas Jefferson, in 1826. On the day in 
question, Dr. Beatty was in his lodgings and the one single remaining vote of the 
delegation, single-term delegate and physician Samuel Dick's vote favoring 
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Record marks the incredible moment simply and pathetically in its 
April 19 official report, when it states Isio the question was lost, 
and the words were struck out"68 for want of one single human 
voice. 
As would be expected under the circumstances, Thomas 
Jefferson was devastated with the outcome, especially with regard 
to its accompanying circumstances. Writing to his friend James 
Madison just six days after the vote, its stinging rebuke was still 
very fresh in his mind. "The clause respecting slavery was lost by 
an individual vote only . . ." he wrote, continuing "[t]he 4 Eastern 
states N. York, Penns., were for the clause. South Carolina, 
Maryland, and !Virginia! voted against it."69 Remembering the 
event several years after the great loss, Jefferson was even more 
morose and apocalyptic in seeking to properly contextualize the 
scope of the pregnant moment past. "The voice of a single 
individual of the state which was divided," or of one of those 
which were of the negative, would have prevented this abominable 
Jefferson's abolition clause, could not alone carry the delegation. Thus, New 
Jersey officially recorded a `nil' vote on the matter, leaving Jefferson's cause 
but one vote short of approval. Historian Fawn M. Brodie noted that, had Dr. 
Beatty been well and present, New Jersey "would have voted aye," winning the 
day for Jefferson and abolition. FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN 
INTIMATE HISTORY 183 (1974). However, this is speculation and, further, no 
matter how likely to have been the case, beside the point. Beatty was fated not to 
be present, and the nation was fated to struggle on with this problem and its 
progeny, even to this day. 
68 26 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 247 (1784). Given the singular 
quality of the 'question' that was lost that day, incalculable else was likely lost 
as well. In this setting, then, this must qualify as one of the most ominous 
sentences in American history. 
69 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(April 25, 1784), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 
471. The plaintive emphasis marking reference to his own home state is the 
author's own. 
70 Jefferson is quite correct in recognizing not one but two different avenues 
to the cherished outcome that was not to be, from the votes cast in Congress that 
day. We have canvassed the situation of Dr. Beatty above, whose health on the 
day in question prevented New Jersey from providing the seventh 'aye' vote to 
carry the day on territorial abolition. But there was another vote that could have 
made that difference even without a New Jersey affirmative. Aside from 
Jefferson, every voting Southern delegate voted against Jefferson's proposal, 
with the exception of his 'good friend' Hugh Williamson from North Carolina. 
Richard Dobbs Spaight, Williamson's companion delegate in the two-person 
delegation from that state, voted with the other Southern delegates, rendering 
North Carolina a 'divided' delegation in the vote. Even without New Jersey, had 
Spaight found his way to his co-delegate's side in the matter, North Carolina 
would have added its voice against the institution and in favor of territorial 
abolition, winning the day for Jefferson, and the nation. 
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crime from spreading itself over the new country,"7I he moaned, 
adding with a flourish as poignant today as the day it coursed from 
his pen over two hundred years ago, "& heaven was silent in that 
awful moment!"72 
In summary, when a then septuagenarian Thomas Jefferson 
received the "momentous [Missouri] question . . ." in 1820, 
famously, "like a fire bell in the night . . . ,"73 as harsh and 
frightening as that alarm was, it could not have been truly 
unexpected. If the analogy is reasonably carried to its limit, the 
nation was by 1820 something of a 'tinderbox,' and human slavery 
formed a series of barely controlled brush fires across that land. 
Though the formal record is silent on the matter, in receiving the 
alarm of Missouri with regard to African-origin human slavery 
within the American experiment, it is not difficult to imagine 
Jefferson's mind wandering back to that spring day thirty-five 
years earlier, when one vote made such a great difference. 
Territory which would in time take on regular, familiar and even 
ominous names, racially speaking—Alabama, Mississippi, 
Tennessee and Kentucky and, by influence, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Missouri itself—all scot-free of slavery and slavery 
accoutrements, every inch, but for a single 'aye.' Jefferson was not 
exaggerating one whit when he noted of that awful historical 
moment, "Thus we see the fate of millions unborn hanging on the 
tongue of one man . . .";74 indeed many, many millions, to be more 
accurate, with six young men prominent among those many, even 
two-plus centuries into the future, from Jena, Louisiana. 
71 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 54. 
72 Id. 
73 Though his quote is well known, it is worthy of repetition here in its 
entirety: "But this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened 
and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is 
hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final 
sentence." 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John 
Holmes (April 22, 1820), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 
46, at 157. 
74 Supra note 54. 
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C. Act III: "the judgment of heaven on a Country . . . . "75  
For the last act of our 'tragedy,' Thomas Jefferson retires from 
the stage altogether, replaced by the quintessential 'all-star cast,' 
including such luminaries as Dr. Franklin, John Adams, James 
Madison, George Washington, George Mason, and the like. These 
are "the Fifty-five . . ." the great "Founding Fathers," fated to have 
one last good go at African-origin slavery for the benefit of the 
"more perfect union . . ." of their late eighteenth century 
imagination. But the problem before them to address and solve is 
not merely political but jurisprudential also—not just a problem of 
resources and actions, conveniences and consequences, but one of 
ideas as well, and perhaps mainly so. In this way, if we are to fully 
understand the character of the work 'the Founders' completed in 
1787, we must add two more persons to the mix, two who through 
their own ideas were with the fifty-five in their deliberations 
throughout that fateful summer: John Locke76 and Thomas 
75 These words of Virginian George Mason at the famed Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were meant to communicate 
his disapproval of the institution of human slavery to his fellow conventioneers 
who were considering where it would fit in the new republic, if anywhere at all. 
The full flavor of Mason's comments are worth repeating here: 
Slavery discourages arts & manufactures. The poor despise 
labor when performed by slaves. They prevent the 
immigration of Whites, who really enrich & strengthen a 
Country. They produce the most pernicious effect on manners. 
Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the 
judgment of heaven on a Country. As nations can not be 
rewarded or punished in the next world they must be in this. 
By an inevitable chain of causes & effects providence 
punishes national sins, by national calamities. 
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1786 504 
(Bicentennial ed. W.W. Norton & Co.1987) 
76 Political philosopher and English visionary John Locke was born in 1632 
and died at the turn of the eighteenth century at seventy-two. He was educated 
as a medical doctor, though his agile and well-trained mind carried him far 
beyond this educational anchor-point. He was the premier natural rights 
philosopher of his day, arguing for popular sovereignty in direct 
contradistinction to 'the divine right of kings . . .' and its philosophical 
champion, Sir Robert Filmer. This brought him to the attention of Parliament in 
its fight against the unbridled power of the British Crown which culminated in 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Much of the strength of his arguments in that 
regard was distilled in his famous Second Treatise of Government, in which he 
took on the royal prerogative directly, along with many other things. Among the 
many intellectuals coming under the influence of the body of Locke's great 
work are included all of the late Enlightenment humanists (Hume, Kant, Thomas 
Paine, Adam Smith, etc.) and, in some way, all of the American 'Founding 
Fathers.' Most prominent in that group was Thomas Jefferson who, it was 
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Hobbes.77 With the inclusion of these two, along with 'the 
Founders'—and arguably not before or without—the Act III cast is 
complete and our stage is fully set. 
If founding a nation is like building a building, then two 
lessons from building would have analogous application to the 
founding. First, the base of the building—its foundation, the thing 
upon which the visible structure will be connected and anchored—
is invaluable. In executing a plan to build a building, from 
blueprinted drawings to first spade-turn to turn-key, up to one-third 
of the cost of the project can be sunk in a place where no one 
would think to look: its foundation.78 The reason for this is clear, 
and intuitive to even the least introspective among us: foundations 
alone provide the 'grip' a building will depend upon to weather the 
inevitable and sometimes even ubiquitous storms it will encounter 
throughout the full course of its life. Religious antiquity in its 
publicly suggested at the time, did little more than channel John Locke in the 
most energetic portions of his Declaration of Independence. There, Jefferson 
candidly noted, "Richard Henry Lee charged . . . [the Declaration] as copied 
from Locke's treatise on government." 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August 30 1823), in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 46, at 267-68. Jefferson was quick to defend 
himself from that charge, noting "[W]hether I had gathered my ideas from 
reading or reflection I do not know. I know only that I turned to neither book nor 
pamphlet while writing it." Id at 268. For our purposes here, we will focus most 
of our attention on Locke's pristine ideas around governmental power, 
formation and dissolution in his Second Treatise, as it may have influenced 'the 
Founders' in 1787. 
77 	 • Historian and political philosopher Thomas Hobbes was born in 1588 and 
died in 1679 at the age of 91. Much like his successor and philosophical 
antagonist follower, John Locke, Hobbes was drawn to political philosophy 
through observations of the events of his day, namely those around the English 
Civil War. Also, like John Locke and his Second Treatise of Government, the 
most famous of Hobbes's writings—Leviathan--came directly from 
observations of that conflict. While he would be listed as an influence in the 
development of Locke's thinking after him, that influence was mostly 
contrapuntal. The subject of their writing and the broad events of their day 
would conspire to render them antagonists on either side of the critical question, 
"From where does political power originate and derive, and how ought it 
legitimately to be expressed?" The best of their antithetical thoughts would be 
available to `the Founders' as that group wrestled with the same questions in the 
American context a century later. 
78 I heard this `fact' many years ago in a church sermon, and it has always 
fascinated me. Not conversant in any aspect of architecture or building, I was 
always concerned that it might derive more from homiletic hyperbole than 
actual fact. Nevertheless, the image was so powerful and the ensuing life-lesson 
so strong that I was not required to be concerned about precision, then or now. 
As the analogy serves something of the same purpose in this usage as it did in its 
original setting, I will use it here in the same spirit, with apologies to the 
builders among my readers who may 'know' better. 
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Western Christian tradition provides a vivid word-picture example 
of the extreme cost of failing to make room for this inviolable truth 
in 'building a house.'" 
A second principle follows closely after the first: as goes the 
foundation, so goes the building. Put another way, if one is 
building for longevity and antiquity, special attention must be paid 
to constructing according to (i.e., consistent with) the quality and 
character of the foundation that has been laid. To build 
inconsistently with the foundation is to forfeit some significant 
portion of the security for which one pays in taking on the 
construction project in the first place. The house that is built 
inconsistently with the foundation on which it is laid is a house 
incompletely anchored to the very thing designed to protect it, a 
house that in consequence must fear a good, stiff breeze. If the 
building in question is 'for show' only, then the risk and possible 
loss is not as substantial as it might be. But if the purpose of the 
building is for it to be 'lived in,' then the consequences of 
inconsistent building are potentially far more severe, especially for 
the ones for whom it is expected to serve as home. 
When 'the Founders' gathered in Philadelphia to begin 
building the 'new building' for the young nation, they had the great 
benefit of a firm foundation on which to lay their vital work. This 
foundation was the Declaration of Independence, of course, a 
`natural law' platform of the first order, one placing universal 
equality, popular sovereignty, at the corner of the building—the 
Republic—from which all of the beneficences of "Nature and . . . 
Nature's God . . ."8° could be anticipated to flow. Indeed, the 
Declaration-inspired revolution was Locke's naturalist Chapter 
XIX sprung to life, the colonists gaining the right to revolt "when 
the Legislative is broken, or dissolved . . . , "when . . . [the] 
Prince sets up his own Arbitrary Will in place of the Laws . . ."'2 or 
79 Self-proclaimed rabbi and Jewish mystic Jesus Christ is reported to have 
related by means of a parable closing his famous 'Sermon on the Mount.' There, 
he illustrated the importance to a building—or, analogously, to a life—of a sure 
and steadfast foundation-anchor, by contrasting two houses, one built upon a 
rock, and one built upon sand, i.e., one with and one without a sure foundation at 
its base. Eschatologically, the variation in the fate of the two because of the 
difference was nothing less than the contrast between life and death. See 
Matthew 7:24-27 (King James). 
80 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
81 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 407 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689) (emphasis in the original). See THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 7. (U.S. 1776). 
82 LOCKE, supra note 81, at 408. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 3-5 (U.S. 1776). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
239 	 'SLAVERY' AND THE JENA 6 	 2010] 
"[w]hen the Prince hinders the Legislative from assembling in its 
due time . . . ."83 The gathering in Philadelphia itself—this 
naturalist convening to constitute—channeled Lock's Chapters VII 
and VIII, where "Men . . joyn and unite into a Community . . . ,'184 
"with a Power to Act as one Body . . . ,"85 "by the Law of Nature 
and Reason, the power of the whole"86 to create government "by 
settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties . . . 
."87 What remained to the Conventioners was to build the building 
according to the foundation, and every single of the fifty-five knew 
that this seminal task would be most tested in the area they had 
neglected to settle with the Declaration itself or Jefferson's 
Ordinance of 1784 following:88 human slavery in a 'free 
republic.'89 
While the practical question before the Philadelphia contingent 
in 1787 was put in terms of how to address the matter of human 
slavery in the 'new republic', the meta-physical question—the real 
question—was much simpler than that. They had imagined, 
popularized, prosecuted and won a war on unalloyed natural law 
jurisprudence, one that had not even the smallest place for the 
vicious inequality of positivist human slavery; all of Enlightenment 
natural rights agreed. For John Locke, slavery was "so vile and 
miserable an Estate of Man . . . ,"" "the State of War continued . . 
.
,,91 arguably lending extraordinary powers to the victim to meet 
the exquisite circumstances: 
83 LOCKE, supra note 81, at 409. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 6, 8 (U.S. 1776). 
" LOCKE, supra note 81, at 331. 
85 Id 
86 Id. at 332. 
87 Id. at 324. 
88 Given the historically appreciated outcomes of these actions by 'the 
Founders,' we might reasonably denominate these early American efforts 'strike 
1' and 'strike 2,' respectively. 
89 By the time the nation arrived at its reset point in 1787, the problem of 
African-origin slavery in the democratic republic was a mystery to absolutely no 
one. The debate was both popular and hot when 'the Founders' sat down to their 
task in Philadelphia that summer. Simply—and profoundly—the problem 
centered on the obvious oxy-moronism of the twin descriptors of America at that 
time: 'slave' and 'republic.' 
" LOCKE, supra note 81, at 141. In fact, these are the very first words with 
which Locke opens the first of his two treatises of government, and he employs 
unequivocal language in doing so. "§1. Slavery is so vile and miserable an 
Estate of Man, and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of 
our Nation; that 	 hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a 
Gentleman, should plead for't." Id at 159. 
91 Id. at 284 (emphasis in the original). 
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I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would 
take away my Liberty, would not . . . take away 
everything else. And therefore it is Lawful for me to 
treat him, as one who has put himself into a State of 
War with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard 
does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a 
State of War, and is aggressor in it.92 
Among natural rights theorist, including Montesquieu,93  
Rousseau" and Grotius himself,95 Locke is unique in this way only 
in the extremeness of his expression of what is for natural law 
jurisprudence a universal position. In fact, in order to find 
jurisprudence for an opposite result, 'the Founders' would need to 
leave the rational confines of natural rights/natural law and enter 
the comparatively murky world of positivism and its own 
intellectual champion, Thomas Hobbes. 
As John Locke after him, Thomas Hobbes took as his own 
philosophical starting point 'the state of nature,' though for Hobbes 
this was a much more extreme place than for Locke, a place of 
92 Id at 280 (emphasis in the original). 
93 For Charles Secondat Baron de Montesquieu the matter was simple: 
"Slavery, properly so called, is the establishment of a right which gives to one 
man such a power over another as renders him absolute master of his life and 
fortune. The state of slavery is in its own nature bad." MONTESQUIEU, DE 
L'ESPRIT DES LOIS (THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS) 235 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Hafner Press 7th prtg. 1975) (1748). 
94 At the close of an erudite attack on the nominally disparate position of 
Hugo de Groot (Grotius) on human slavery, Jean-Jacques Rousseau was 
categorical in disclaiming a 'natural right' to human slavery: 
Thus, in whatever way we view things, the right of slavery is 
null, not only because it is illegitimate, but because it is absurd 
and meaningless. These words, slavery and right, are 
contradictory; they are mutually exclusive. Whether addressed 
by a man to a man, or by a man to a people, such a speech as 
this will always be equally foolish: I make a convention with 
you wholly at your expense and wholly for my profit, which I 
shall observe as long as I please and which you also shall 
observe as long as I please. 
ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT) 12 (Charles M. 
Sherover trans., Harper & Row 1984) (1762) (emphasis in the original). 
95 
 Known popularly as the 'father of international law,' Dutch philosopher 
Hugo de Groot imagined a very narrow isthmus involving formally declared war 
and treated peace where slavery might preserve a small, proscribed life within a 
natural law regime. Short-formed 'prize of war' theory, it was extremely 
controversial, frowned upon by most of his natural law/rights fraternity, rejected 
altogether by Rousseau, and in any event very narrowly drawn. Suffice it to say, 
even in its most generous reading, it offered no intellectual or jurisprudential 
haven whatsoever for African/American slavery. 
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"that miserable condition of Warre . . ."96 full of "our naturall 
Passions . . . Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like"97 a place of 
"danger, and fear of Invasion . . . open force, and secret arts . . . 
.
1998 In these extremes, man has no real choice but to "conferre all 
their power and strength upon one Man . . . to beare their Person . . 
. to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgments, 
to his Judgment."99 The gain in such a bargain, theoretically at 
least, is safety and security—"[that] they may nourish themselves 
and live contentedly . . . ,"100 but here is a cost: under this regime 
of absolute will, law—positive law—is anything whatsoever 
emanating from the will of the sovereign, that he can imagine in 
his mind and enforce with his bare arm, his iron fist.' The 
Philadelphia conventioneers could legitimate human slavery in the 
republican democracy, but only by admixing natural law with 
`positive energy'; this is an 'unholy brew' in theory, with possible 
drastic negative consequences for the nation attempting it, if the 
`building' analogies referenced above are in any way accurate.1°2 
For these conventioneers in 1787, these men of great responsibility 
and moment, these men destined thereafter to be popularized by 
and for generations following—for this very work—as nothing less 
than 'the Founders . ,' as between 'high theory' and low estate', 
for the ultimate good of the nation they were charged to imagine, 
what would they choose? 
" THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651). 
97 M. 
98 Id. at 118. 
" Id. at 120. 
1°° 
10 ' Of course, this is a drastic oversimplification of a very subtle and 
important 'truth' for Hobbes, almost 'cartoon Hobbes' if you will, for the crude 
purposes necessary in this point. However, I do contend for its accuracy . . . if 
`cartoon,' it is a very good and very illustrative one, for present purposes. 
Hobbes goes on to elaborate on this startling theory, but his elaborations do 
nothing to ameliorate its sharp edges. In a 'positive law' regime, legitimate law 
is limited only by the imagination of the sovereign, and his configuring strength. 
In Hobbes's positive law, the moral question—the 'ought' of law—is entirely 
subsumed by the power question— the 'can' of law—matters being ultimately 
governed as legal depending upon what the sovereign can do rather what it 
ought to do. Thus, where moral law (natural law/right) would have 'the 
Founders' recognize natural freedom in all, positive law would frame the 
question in power calculus terms, legitimating slavery if the sovereign could get 
away with it. 
102 I am particularly referencing the second of the 'building' points raised 
above regarding the value, and indeed the necessity, of taking careful account of 
the foundation in planning and prosecuting the building. 
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From our vantage point, of course, the question is: what did 
they choose? Sixty-five years after the fact, ethical philosopher and 
abolitionist journalist Frederick Douglass might have provided the 
following answer to that foundational question: 
The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are 
not enjoyed in common.—The rich inheritance of 
justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, 
bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by 
me. The sunlight that brought life and healing to 
you, has brought stripes and death to me. This 
Fourth [of] July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, 
I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the 
grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon 
him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman 
mockery and sacrilegious irony.]°3  
Historian and social philosopher W.E.B. DuBois might have 
addressed the same question the following way at the 
commencement of a new century, fifty years after Douglass and 
more than one hundred years after this work of 'the Founders': 
"[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the 
color-line."104 Moral philosopher, natural lawyer and twentieth 
century icon Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. answered the question in 
the most profound of ways when he told a 1963 crowd in 
Washington D.C., and the watching world: "I have a dream my 
four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not 
be judged by the color of their skin but by [the] content of their 
character."1°5 The work of 'the Founders' in this regard can 
reasonably be judged and found wanting in ultimate result by any 
number of persons in twenty-first century, more than two hundred 
years after they took it up on our behalf, not least of which are 
those of the 'Jena 6.' 
103 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, What To the Slave Is the Fourth of July?, in THE 
OXFORD FREDERICK DOUGLASS READER 116 (William Andrews ed., 1996) 
(emphasis in the original). 
104 W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (Penguin Books 1989) 
(1903). 
105 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I Have a Dream, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 219 (James Melvin Washington ed. 1986). 
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III. EPILOGUE: THEN . . . AND NOW 
Fresh from his party's nomination for the Illinois Senatorial 
contest of 1858, Abraham Lincoln rose in the Springfield 
statehouse on the evening of June 16, to address an audience of 
over one thousand of his fellow Republicans. As this would be his 
`kickoff speech to a campaign in which his opponent would be no 
less a statesman superstar than the 'Little Giant' himself,1°6 there 
was great anticipation in the Hall of Representatives as to the 
words he would choose, and the tone he would take. Those who 
believed moderation on the 'slavery question' to have been the 
safest and most politically expedient course to travel could not 
have been pleased at Lincoln's own position in this regard, plain 
from the opening words of his speech: 
If we could first know where we are, and wither we 
are tending, we could better judge what to do, and 
how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year, 
since a policy was initiated, with the avowed object, 
and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery 
agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that 
agitation has not only, not ceased, but has 
constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not 
cease, until a crisis shall have been reached, and 
passed. "A house divided against itself cannot 
stand." I believe this government cannot endure, 
permanently half slave and halffree.1°7 
Even his closest and most sympathetic supporters believed he 
had done himself irreparable political harm with his forthright 
stance, including a close co-worker, who "predicted his [Senate] 
defeat, charging it to the first ten lines of the speech."1°8 Lincoln 
was calm in the face of unremitting criticism of his carefully 
chosen words, though resolute: "The time has come when these 
106 I am referring to the great Stephen A. Douglas, of course, and the 
Senatorial campaign, which would give the world the famous Lincoln/Douglas 
Debates. 
107 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). Given my own employment of 'building' 
metaphor through which to understand America's efforts and mistakes regarding 
law and American slavery in the nation's earliest days, Lincoln's own famous 
and powerful use here should be seen as more than merely coincidental. This 
matter is more fully explicated in the Epilogue to this paper. 
108 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE LINCOLN READER 229 (Paul M. Angle ed., 
1947). 
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sentiments should be uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go 
down because of this speech, then . . . let me die in the advocacy of 
what is just and right."I09 It is worth noting that he began that 
defensive with a simple but important conviction: "Friends, this 
thing has been retarded long enough."' I°  
Retarded long enough, indeed. From our vantage point in time, 
knowing of the days to follow Lincoln's great speech as well as the 
earliest days where "it all began . . ," we should not miss the deep 
irony attending his powerful preferred metaphor. If the 'house' was 
almost completely divided when Lincoln called attention to the 
problem in 1858, who would have dared notice that the very 
beginnings of the mitotic reality lay seventy-plus years earlier, and 
by application of the most unexpected of hands? Who was there to 
tell Mr. Lincoln that the 'mess' with which he was so totally 
embroiled and in service of which he would yield his own life, was 
effectively made by others honored in the nation's cultural 
memory for their own singular service as 'Founders' those years 
before? Who would tell Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney that the 
`Founding Fathers,' "the men who framed this declaration . . . 
great men . . . incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with 
those on which they were acting . . . I I were not only capable of 
such, but guilty of it, in the most hypocritical of ways? Who would 
tell 'the people' fated to bleed and die a few short years after 
Lincoln's bold speech, what was really happening, and why? 
And who will tell the 'Jena 6'? What will we tell them? That 
they were presently caught up in a passion play tracing back to the 
founding of America and beyond, to a problem well within the 
ability of the nation to have 'fixed' at key points of its early 
history?112 That they battled a ghost, a phantom, a socio-cultural 
109 Id. This prescient man was even more firm in the face of almost 
unanimous post-speech criticism of his words, especially his unfortunate 
selection of the 'house divided' metaphor. "If I had to draw a pen across my 
record, and erase my whole life from sight, and I had one poor gift or choice left 
as to what I should save from the wreck, I should choose that speech and leave it 
to the world unerased." Id. I cannot leave this point without yielding to the too 
easy opportunity of stating the obvious: historically, this 'house divided' oration 
was not erased, of course, but instead has taken its place among the great 
political speeches in American history. Of course, it was not the last great 
speech in that man. 
110m 
I 1 1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 363, 410 (1857) [sic] (Chief Justice 
Roger Brook Taney, draftsman. It is worth recalling that Mr. Chief Justice 
Taney's defense of the 'Founders' concerned the very matter at issue in this 
piece). 
112 I reference the term 'fix' here very carefully, of course. The dynamic of 
history is so pristine that it is impossible to say whether a different decision from 
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construct having the stuff and substance of air, but pressing down 
on them—on all of them—nonetheless, with a weight difficult to 
resist and impossible to deny?113 That in failing to do what they 
could to address the problem at its root, 'the Founders' have left us 
with a bitter harvest, coming in year after year in various forms, 
with particular iteration in Jena, Louisiana, resisting any and all 
efforts at surface-level amelioration?' 14 
This last, a simple agricultural analogy, brings to mind the 
almost organic connection between past and present, between 
`then' and 'now,' and calls upon those among us wise enough to 
fully appreciate this connection to deeply consider it. In each of the 
situations outlined above—past situations and past choices 
exerting pressure on our present-day realities even to today—
eighteenth century America was gifted with clear information and 
faced with an equally clear choice. The choice was not between 
`right' and 'wrong' in the purest senses of those words. When 'the 
Founders' met in 1787, that question had been conceptually settled 
nearly eleven years before, and had been understood to have been 
so settled, even if implications of the Declaration's 
uncompromising language were not fully appreciated. Instead, the 
choice was between convenience and inconvenience,1 15 between 
`the Founders' on the difficult political issue facing them in 1787 would have 
yielded a positive result regarding the African-American historical experience. It 
surely would have yielded an alternative one, and it is not anti-intellectual to 
imagine that difference positively, when laid against the static backdrop of the 
actual the history with which the American experience has actually been 
embroiled. But it remains necessary to own the speculative nature of this 
`conclusion,' of course. 
113 It is one of those inevitable metaphysical consequences of history that 
actions in a real-time present are too often dictated by particular aspects of a past 
that, if intellectually accessible to us, remain almost irresistible regarding our 
choices and our actions. In this way, life looks too much like Shakespeare's 
Macbethian passion play, in which we "strut and fret[] . . . [our] hour upon the 
stage, [a]nd then . . . [are] heard no more . . . ." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
MACBETH act 5, sc.5. Although I should add, referencing the rest of the quote 
("it is a tale [t]old by an idiot, full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing"), that 
I see the stage dance as much more significant than does the Great Bard, from 
this rendering. 
114 I offer here one further disclaimer on the counter-factual implications of 
this question. I do not mean to draw a direct link here between the actions of 
`the Founders' and the outcomes following, including the 'Jena 6.' I mean only 
to suggest an influence of the one over the other, which suggestion is not 
outrag.eous under the circumstances. 
115 This is a simple way of saying that the choice before 'the Founders' was 
not a moral choice, though their decision clearly had moral implications. 
Instead, the choice was effectively a political one, asking when and whether 'the 
Founders' would do the 'right thing' and set the country on the path best suited 
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what we should do over and against what we may get away with, 
what we say about ourselves and who we are, and we have borne 
the brunt of 'the Founders' decision on that question ever since. 
One lesson we can take from this interface between 
foundational history and 'Jena 6'—a lesson addressing the 'then' 
of this interface—underscores the importance of timing in 
attending to obvious and notorious social ills. W.E.B. DuBois puts 
the matter clearly and rightly in his still-important The Suppression 
of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America 1638— 
1870.11  As to the sheer size of the choice before 'the Founders' 
to the ultimate realization of its self-identified cultural ideals. To better illustrate 
the point here, I will reference a letter from Revolutionary patriot and American 
iconic hero Patrick Henry—he of "[g]ive me liberty, or give me death!" fame—
to a relative, Mr. Robert Pleasants, on the occasion of the receipt by the former 
of the gift from the latter of an anti-slavery invective by Anthony Benezet 
entitled OBSERVATIONS ON THE INSLAVING, IMPORTING AND PURCHASING OF 
NEGROES (1750). Henry was candid about his own thoughts in that regard: 
I take this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of Anthony 
Benezet's book against the slave trade . . . . It is not a little 
surprising that the professors of Christianity, whose chief 
excellence consists in softening the human heart in cherishing 
and improving its finer feelings, should encourage a practice 
so totally repugnant to the first impression of right and wrong. 
. . . Is it not amazing that at a time when the rights of 
humanity are defined and understood with precision, in a 
country above all others fond of liberty; that in such an age 
and in such a country we find men professing a religion the 
most humane, mild, gentle, and generous, adopting a principle 
as repugnant to humanity as it is inconsistent with the Bible 
and destructive to Liberty. . . ? 
. . . I cannot but wish well to a people whose System 
imitates the example of Him whose life was perfect. – And 
believe me, I shall honor the Quakers for their noble effort to 
abolish slavery. It is equally calculated to promote moral and 
political good. . 
. . . Would any one believe that I am the master of slaves 
of my own purchase! I am drawn along by the general 
inconvenience of living without them. I will not, I cannot 
justify it. However culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my 
devoir to virtue, as to own the excellence and rectitude of her 
precepts, and lament my want of conformity to them. . 
PATRICK HENRY, Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (January 18, 
1773), in PATRICK HENRY IN HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 66-7 (James M. 
Elson ed., 2007). This question was not based in right and wrong for Patrick 
Henry, but rather grounded itself in mundane matters of convenience and 
inconvenience. So it was for the bulk of his nation. 
116 W.E.B. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE –TRADE TO 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1896). 
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and its place in American history, DuBois writes, "[n]o American 
can study the connection of slavery with United States history, and 
not devoutly pray that his country may never have a similar social 
problem to solve, until it shows more capacity for such work than 
it has shown in the past."'" Regarding the unvarnished 
pusillanimity of the choice our Fathers made in 1787, DuBois is 
equally candid: 
[T]here began, with 1787, that system of 
bargaining, truckling, and compromising with a 
moral, political, and economic monstrosity, which 
makes the history of our dealing with slavery . . . so 
discreditable to a great people. Each generation 
sought to shift its load upon the next, and the 
burden rolled on, until a generation came which was 
both too weak and too strong to bear it longer.' 8 
And with regard to the matter of timing—the proper 'when' of 
addressing such matters as those facing the Founders' in this 
regard—DuBois is rightly uncompromising: 
How far in a State can a recognized moral wrong 
safely be compromised? And although this chapter 
of history can give us no definite answer suited to 
the ever-varying aspects of political life, yet it 
would seem to warn any nation from allowing, 
through carelessness and moral cowardice, any 
social evil to grow. No persons would have seen the 
Civil War with more surprise and horror than the 
Revolutionists of 1776; yet from the small and 
apparently dying institution of their day arose the 
walled and castled Slave-Power. From this we may 
conclude that it behooves nations as well as men to 
do things at the very moment when they ought to be 
done.11Y  
Another lesson to be drawn from this passion-play is rooted in 
the 'now' and it is simply this: the past is not truly 'past' until it is 
put fully to rest in some real 'present'. Too often in the present day 
discourse around America's systemic, endemic race problem, a 
"7 Id at 197. 
118 Id at 198. 
119 Id. at 199. 
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problem clearly echoing vestiges of America's under-addressed 
slavery past,12° minority angst is blithely voided by the majority 
dismissive "That was long ago . . . why can't you people get over 
it?"12I If American slavery is in fact America's "original sin . . . 
,,122 then it is a sin that has its strong echoes throughout all of 
American history, even to today. We cannot pretend that it does 
not exist and we cannot wish it away. This is a problem of our own 
careful construction, deliberately planted and cultivated in the 
earliest days of our republic and violently exposed, protected and 
exploited throughout our history, and 'Jena 6' reminds us at least 
that the problem is still in need of national attention and national 
resolve.I23  
There is a third 'lesson' to be derived from this inquiry—
though, given its nature as essentially speculative rather than 
definitive, I might more honestly present it as 'postulate' rather 
than `lesson'—and it is simply this: jurisprudence matters. For if 
Lincoln's house was in fact divided "against itself . . . ,,,124 it was  
1213 History traces an organic connection between America's racist past and 
its racial present, from slavery through post-reconstruction 'Jim Crow-ism' 
through American apartheid and the civil rights response through present 
antipathy and inequality of opportunity. Anyone ignoring this clear connection 
is naïve, disingenuous, mean-spirited, or some negative combination of the 
three. 
121  Anecdotally, and frustratingly, to be frank, I have personally received 
this pejorative countless times. This argument is falsely conceived in so many 
ways as to warrant or deserve no real intellectual attention here at all. 
122 These are the words of then-Senator-now-President Barack Obama-
himself a history-maker in the ongoing drama of race in America, of course—in 
his famous campaign address on race in this country. If we add a rider regarding 
the North American Indians as of a piece with America's slavery heritage, 
President Obama has it just about right: Barack Obama, Remarks of Barack 
Obama: A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008), available at 
http://my.barackobama.com/page/contentlhisownwords.  
123 I think the recent trend toward official apology from various states is an 
encouraging step in the direction of dialogue and acknowledgement and 
responsibility and healing. Nations—like people—have spirits, and as the 
selfless acts of acknowledgement and forgiveness have the potential of healing 
individual wounds and restoring individual relationships, such would seem to 
have the same potential regarding this problem in our nation and are thus a 
necessary first step in that direction in any event. Germany's proactive work in 
this way regarding its own mid-twentieth century national sins and responses are 
of some note and relevance in this regard, it would seem. 
124 These words were not Lincoln's own, of course, but were aptly borrowed 
from Jesus Christ, in his discourse against the Pharisees recorded in Matthew 
12:25, more fully "Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste, and no 
city or house divided against itself will stand . . . ." Christ's point there was 
simple, and fit into Lincoln's intentions nicely: if a person or a community 
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also in that day fully divided, North and South, against its own 
foundation, with similarly dramatic apocalyptic results to be 
anticipated in the offing. Professor Arthur Bestor was quite correct 
in re-imagining the very conflagration anticipated by Mr. Lincoln 
in his 1858 address as a "constitutional crisis . . . ,"125 and the 
implications deriving from that truth remain vital to this day. This 
being so, who can fail to note or appreciate that the foundering 
places in the icon at the heart of the crisis, the fault-line in the 
whole, if you will—the "three-fifths compromise,"126 the 1808 
slavery-ban compromise,127 and the notorious "fugitive slave 
clause"128—were the very places where the "Founding Fathers" 
compromised against their foundation to close their deal?129 Who 
can deny that the "Founders' cold failure to build consistently 
with the foundation of naturalist individual liberty they deliberately 
laid in anticipation of the Revolutionary War, would connect itself 
to a still greater war—again, about human liberty—to be 
prosecuted by their very own grandchildren? 
Following this postulate through to its logical end, the 
implications for the discipline of jurisprudence and the persons 
who practice it ought well to be considered. In these examples, of 
which the 'Jena 6' incident is but one, the jurisprudence moves 
from the lofty realm of meta-physics and the esoterica in which 
such is inevitably enmeshed, and lands in the real world, the world 
of sweat and tears, life and death. It is no longer a mere mind 
exercise or point of dry debate among a small few dusty 
philosophers, but a living thing itself, which may have real 
consequences where people live. Jurisprudence becomes not 
merely a way of understanding law, but a guide to law itself, if the 
matter can at least be postulated so strongly, from the 'real world' 
events this paper has considered. In short, from this take, 
jurisprudence matters, and perhaps more fully and urgently than 
has been popularly realized, understood or appreciated. °° 
proactively acts against its own settled best interests, its very survival is in 
jeopardy. 
125 Arthur Bestor, The American Civil Wars as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 
Am. HIST. REV. 327 (1964). 
126 U.S. CONST, art. I,§ 2. 
'" Id. art. I, § 9. 
128 1d. art.IV,§ 2. 
129 As recorded by statesman James Madison from his own copious notes 
taken at the Philadelphia Convention in the summer of 1787, the details of these 
compromises read like a 'who-done-it.' See generally supra note 75. 
13° This matter has been deliberately proposed here as provocatively as I can 
make it. I do not know that any of what I am here suggesting is in fact true, but 
its implication in my presentation is important, and ought to invite the attention 
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In closing, all of the various lessons deriving from 'Jena 6' and 
American history notwithstanding, there seems to be one pristine 
truth associated with it that ought to command the attention of 
every American today, however we have come to own that 
identity.131 Eleven score and nearly fourteen years ago, "our 
fathers brought forth on this continent a new Nation, conceived in 
Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created 
equal."132 Apart from the necessary update, these words are 
famous words, followed when they were broadcast in 1863 by an 
even more famous interrogatory to the nation, put in the form of a 
key propositional inquiry: "Now we are engaged in a great civil 
war, testing whether that Nation, or any Nation so conceived and 
so dedicated can long endure."133 With apologies to its great 
author, 'Jena 6' (and indeed any number of similar incidents in this 
nation's public history from the day he spoke until today) would 
recover that question more tersely, more urgently: "whether that 
nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can even exist 
at all." Within the context of the vastness of the great American 
`experiment', the answer to that question remains "maybe . . ." 
even two-hundred-plus years after our 'Founders' first broached it; 
it will remain "maybe" hereafter, until either it becomes "no" or 
until we suffer the last of our Jena 6's—whichever comes first. 
In the end, the greatest legacy of the 'Jena 6' experience, and 
its most valuable and useful gift, may be to highlight for this nation 
the important reality that, where matters of race in America are 
of the discipline's expertise, toward the end of fully testing the hypothesis. My 
own ongoing thought and work moves deliberately in that direction. 
131 I am being very deliberate here in including all Americans, by whatever 
stripe and whenever arriving, in the ambit of those who must be concerned about 
this part of America's historical tragedy. Too often in the present-day debate 
about how effectively to address America's continuing problem of race, persons 
inclined to disconnect from the problem simply shift responsibility to the 
erstwhile victims as a means of avoidance. The truth of the matter is simply this: 
American culture is an organic whole—not mosaic but melting pot—and though 
we maintain our unique individual heritages in private, they are intertwined, 
indeed subsumed, in our shared public life. To be American is to be joint tenants 
in all of its entitlements and its encumbrances: to partake of its benefits fully 
upon inclusion and to bear equal responsibility in the problems with which we 
all continue to struggle and to seek to overcome. Whether arriving as hopeful 
immigrant just yesterday or tracing ancestry back to the Mayflower itself, in 
being accepted into the American 'family' we all share in its benefits and bear 
our share of its burdens. And this includes responsibility regarding our racial 
problems, past and present, wherever one is situated in the American experience 
and whenever one became 'American.' 
132 7 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
supra note 107, at 23. 
133 Id. at 21. 
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concerned, our present still lies in countervailing context with our 
past, and will, until we embrace that reality, and do something 
about it. While it is tempting to imagine that the remarkable, 
unprecedented events of November 4, 2008 and following have 
ameliorated the hundreds of years of tendentious racial history in 
this country preceding, such thinking is, simply, wishful and naïve. 
Those events have changed the racial discourse in America, 
without doubt, and that in a truly hopeful way; but they have not 
fully discounted the accompanying history, nor fully healed its 
continuing ancillary effects. For that our work still remains, work 
which goal it is to move our nation past benign racial tolerance and 
amelioration to true reconciliation and healing. Only then can we 
hope for incidents like 'Jena 6' to fade from our national stage, 
relics of an age that has rightly and courageously—and finally—
been put to rest. 
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